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Abstract. A steganographer network corresponds to a graphic struc-
ture that the involved vertices (or called nodes) denote social entities
such as the data encoders and data decoders, and the associated edges
represent any real communicable channels or other social links that could
be utilized for steganography. Unlike traditional steganographic algo-
rithms, a steganographer network models steganographic communication
by an abstract way such that the concerned underlying characteristics of
steganography are quantized as analyzable parameters in the network.
In this paper, we will analyze two problems in a steganographer network.
The first problem is a passive attack to a steganographer network where
a network monitor has collected a list of suspicious vertices correspond-
ing to the data encoders or decoders. The network monitor expects to
break (disconnect) the steganographic communication down between the
suspicious vertices while keeping the cost as low as possible. The second
one relates to determining a set of vertices corresponding to the data
encoders (senders) such that all vertices can share a message by neigh-
bors. We point that, the two problems are equivalent to the minimum
cut problem and the minimum-weight dominating set problem.
Keywords: Steganographer network, steganography, steganalysis, cut,
dominating set, graph, social networks.
1 Introduction
Steganography [1] has been extensively studied in past twenty years. As a means
to secret communication, different from cryptography, steganography refers to
the art of hiding a message into an innocent digital object also called cover by
slightly modifying the noise-like components of the host. The resulting object
also called stego will not introduce any noticeable artifacts and will be sent to
the receiver. As steganography even conceals the presence of communication, it
serves an important role in information security nowadays.
A number of advanced steganographic algorithms and novel perspectives have
been reported in the literature such as [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. A most
important requirement [8] for any reliable steganographic system is that it should
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be impossible (or say very hard) for an eavesdropper to distinguish between
ordinary objects and objects containing hidden information. The mainstream
design concept of steganography is to minimize the data embedding impact on
the cover for a required payload, which involves at least two aspects for achieving
superior steganographic performance. The first is to find the most suitable cover
elements for data embedding. For example, complex texture areas within an
image would be quite desirable for steganography. The second is to maximize
data embedding efficiency. For the former, nowadays, we often focus on designing
a suited function for the cover elements that can expose the data embedding
impact. For the latter, cover codes are the key technologies.
Steganography can be also utilized for malicious purposes, which gives the
life of another important research topic called steganalysis. A core work in ste-
ganalysis is to detect whether a given digit object was embedded with a message
or not. The conventional steganalysis algorithms regard this problem as a bi-
nary classification task, which involves feature engineering and classifiers. Due
to the advancement of steganography that tends to alter the cover regions that
are quite hard to detect, conventional featured-based steganalysis algorithms re-
lying on sophisticated manual feature design has been pushed to the limit and
become very hard to improve. To overcome this difficulty, in-deep studies can
be performed on moving the success achieved by deep convolutional neural net-
works (deep CNNs) in computer vision to steganalysis [11], [12], [13], [14]. It
is pointed that, estimating the payload size within a stego, extracting the em-
bedded information and identifying steganographic senders/receivers are all the
important yet quite challenging research topics in steganalysis.
As mentioned in [15], with the rapidly development of social media services
such as Facebook and Twitter, it would be quite desirable to study the social
behaviors, protocols and any other scenarios of steganography. In this sense,
we may not care about the details of the used steganographic algorithms, but
rather quantize the concerned characteristics of steganography as analyzable
parameters for problem optimization. An effective way to analyze steganographic
activities is to model it in a social network, which consists of a set of vertices and
a set of edges. The vertices represent social entities such as the data encoders
and data decoders, and the associated edges represent any real communicable
channels or other social links used for steganography. In [15], the authors model
steganography in an additive-risk social network and present a communication
strategy that aims to minimize the steganographic risk by choosing a set of edges
with the minimum sum of weights.
In this paper, we present a passive attack to steganography in a steganogra-
pher network. We assume that the attacker serves as a network monitor, and has
collected a list of suspicious vertices that are corresponding to the data encoders
and data decoders in advance. Here, the “suspicious vertices” mean that they are
with a high probability representing the steganographic actors though they may
be misjudged in practice. One may use the conventional steganalysis algorithms
or other anomaly detection algorithms to construct the suspicious vertex-set.
We study such a passive attack that, the network monitor hopes to remove a set
The Cut and Dominating Set Problem in A Steganographer Network 3
Fig. 1. An example for steganographer network where the weights represent the cor-
responding removel costs.
of edges so that the suspicious vertices cannot communicate via steganography
while the removal cost could be minimized. In addition to the above-mentioned
attack, we also analyze a new communication scenario in the steganographer net-
work that all the vertices will serve as either a data encoder or a data decoder.
The optimization task is to select a set of vertices (encoders) out such that all
vertices can share a message by edges and the steganographic communication
activities are performed between adjacent vertices in the network. Similarly, we
expect to keep the vertex-selection risk as low as possible.
The rest of this paper are organized as follows. The related work is presented
in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the proposed passive attack. We analyze
a new communication scenario in a steganographer network in Section 4. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Related Work
A steganographer network corresponds to a graph G(V,E), where V = {v1, v2,
..., vn} represents the set of vertices and E = {e1, e2, ..., em} represents the set of
edges. Every edge ek ∈ E involves with a pair of vertices, i.e., ek = (vi, vj). We
say G is undirected meaning that all e ∈ E have no orientation. Namely, (vi, vj)
is equivalent to (vj , vi). A path (if any) between vi and vj corresponds to such
a vertex sequence (vq1 , vq2 , ..., vqt) that vq1 = vi, vqt = vj and (vqk−1 , vqk) ∈ E
for all 2 ≤ k ≤ t. G is connected if and only if for any two vertices in G, there
exists at least one path between them.
In G, a path between vi and vj implies that, vi can share a message with vj
along the path. In [15], the authors present a communication strategy that aims
to minimize the overall steganographic risk by determining a subtree supporting
the required vertices. Mathematically, they use S = {s1, s2, ..., sn1} ⊂ V and
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Fig. 2. Two ways to remove a set of edges making S and T unconnected where S = {v1}
and T = {v5, v7, v8}.
T = {t1, t2, ..., tn2} ⊂ V to denote the encoder set and decoder set. For each
si ∈ S, its individual decoder set is denoted by Ti ⊂ T , meaning that, si hopes
to send a message to each of Ti. Here, ∪n1i=1Ti = T . The optimization task is
to find such a subset of E that it enables all si ∈ S to send a message to all
decoders in Ti, and the overall risk can be minimized. Namely,
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Eusable⊂E
R(S, T,Eusable), (1)
where R(S, T,Eusable) denotes the risk over Eusable ⊂ E.
By assuming an additive-risk network, the optimization task is defined as:
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Eusable⊂E
∑
ei∈Eusable
wi, (2)
where wi > 0 is a real number representing the risk of ei.
The authors in [15] have pointed that Eq. (2) is equivalent to solving the
Steiner Tree Problem (STP) problem [16], which is NP-hard. The STP is seen
as a generalization of two other combinatorial optimization problems, i.e., the
shortest path problem and the minimum spanning tree (MST) problem. If the
STP deals with only two terminals, it reduces to finding a shortest path. If all
vertices are terminals, it is equivalent to the MST problem. Therefore, one may
employ the existing approximation algorithms designed for the STP to find the
suitable strategy for steganographic communication.
The authors also analyze the steganographic communication from a proba-
bilistic graph perspective. They have proved that, a multiplicative probabilistic
graph is equivalent to an additive weighted graph, meaning that, by translat-
ing the probabilistic network into a weighted network, one could find the suited
communication strategy in a similar way.
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Fig. 3. Vertex insertion and edge insertion in a steganographer network.
3 Passive Attack to Steganographer Network
From a monitor point, even if a steganographer does not use the optimized
communication strategy, he can still communicate a message with the desired
receiver since there may exist multiple communicable paths in the network. This
requires the monitor to remove a set of edges corresponding to the channels
such that the steganographer cannot communicate with the receiver. However,
edge removal may result in a high cost or risk. We study this problem in this
section. Mathematically, we expect to remove a set of edges Eopt such that S
cannot communicate with T via steganography, while the removal operation
could result in the lowest risk (cost), i.e.,
Eopt(S, T ) = arg min
Erem⊂E
R(S, T,Erem). (3)
We assign a weight wi > 0 to ei ∈ E. wi represents the cost of removing ei
from G. We assume an additive G, i.e.,
R(S, T,Erem) =
∑
ei∈Erem
wi, (4)
which makes the problem amenable to mathematical analysis and the additive
assumption is reasonable since two edges far away to each other have ignorable
interaction and interaction between edges near to each other can be scored by
weights.
In the real-world, for the network monitor, it is very likely that he cannot
identify Ti for si, meaning that, he may aim to disconnect the links between S
and T , rather than that between si and Ti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. This assumption has
been utilized in this section. We define the simplest attack for which |S| = 1 as
single encoder attack. We expect to find a subset of E such that there has no path
between s1 and each vertex in T by removing the selected edges. And, the sum of
weights should be minimum. Fig. 1 shows a steganographer network. Assuming
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that, S = {v1} and T = {v5, v7, v8}. Fig. 2 provides two ways to divide S and T
into two different connected components. It is seen that, different sets of edges
corresponds to different costs, e.g., the cost for Fig. 2 (a) is 13 + 17 + 31 = 61,
and that for Fig. 2 (b) is 27. We should find a method to separate S and T with
the lowest cost. Notice that, we assume that S ∩ T = ∅.
In graph theory, a cut is defined as a partition of the vertices of a graph into
two disjoint subsets. Specifically, a cut C = (A,B) divides V into two subsets A
and B. The cut-set of C corresponds to an edge-set {(u, v) ∈ E|u ∈ A, v ∈ B}.
Notice that, A∩B = ∅ and A∪B = V . If a ∈ V and b ∈ V are specified vertices
of G, we then say a-b cut is a cut in which a ∈ A and b ∈ B. In a weighted
graph, the weight of a cut is defined as the sum of weights of edges belonging to
the cut. A cut is therefore called as minimum cut if its weight is not larger than
that of any other cut. Obviously, the minimum cut is not unique.
A directed graph is called as a flow network if each edge has a capacity and
receives a flow. A flow in a directed graph must satisfy the restriction that the
amount of flow into a vertex is equal to the amount of flow out of the vertex,
unless it is the source vertex which has only outgoing flow, or sink vertex which
has only incoming flow. Mathematically, the capacity of a directed edge vi → vj
is a mapping c : E 7→ R+, denoted by c(vi, vj). It represents the maximum
amount of flow that can pass through vi → vj . It is noted that, c(vj , vi) is
different from c(vi, vj). If vi → vj /∈ E, one may consider c(vi, vj) = 0. A flow is
a mapping f : E 7→ R+ subject to two constraints [17]:
f(vi, vj) ≤ c(vi, vj),∀ vi → vj ∈ E, (5)
and ∑
vi→vj∈E
f(vi, vj) =
∑
vj→vi∈E
f(vj , vi),∀ vi ∈ V \ {a, b}, (6)
where a is the source vertex and b is the sink vertex.
Without the loss of generality, an undirected graph can be treated as “di-
rected” since an undirected edge (vi, vj) ∈ E can be decomposed into two di-
rected edges vi → vj and vj → vi. For simplicity, we sometimes use vi → vj
to represent a directed edge from vi to vj and vj → vi from vj to vi though
(vi, vj) ∈ E is undirected in G in this paper. It also means that, vi → vj ∈ E
and vj → vi ∈ E.
With Eqs. (5, 6), the value of a flow is defined by |f | = ∑v∈V f(a, v) or
|f | = ∑v∈V f(v, b). It means the amount of flow from the source vertex to the
sink vertex. The maximum flow problem is therefore to maximize |f |, namely,
to route as much flow as possible from a to b. Notice that, if a → v /∈ E, one
may set f(a, v) = 0 ≤ c(a, v) = 0. A lot of practical algorithms can be applied
for determining the maximum flow such as [18], [19], [20]. For a steganographer
network, by regarding the weights as the flow capacity, we can determine the
maximum flow between any two vertices. Therefore, an undirected steganogra-
pher network can be translated as a flow network. A necessary preprocessing
is to decompose each edge into two directed edges, for which both the newly
assigned weights should equal the original one.
The Cut and Dominating Set Problem in A Steganographer Network 7
Fig. 4. Vertex contraction in a steganographer network: (a) vertex contraction and (b)
a new graph.
The max-flow min-cut theorem [17] states that,
Theorem 1. In a flow network, the maximum amount of flow passing through
the source vertex is equal to the weight of the minimum cut.
It indicates that, the smallest weight sum of the edges which if removed
would disconnect the source vertex from the sink vertex is equal to the weight
of the minimum cut, which is also equal to the maximum flow from the source
to the sink. In order to find Eopt(S, T ) shown in Eq. (3), we need to determine
the maximum flow in G(V,E). Then, we construct the minimum cut. The edges
in the minimum cut will constitute Eopt(S, T ). The maximum flow problem
generally deals with only one source vertex and one sink vertex. However, we
have n1 ≥ 1 or n2 ≥ 1, indicating that, we cannot directly use a maximum flow
algorithm in the steganographer network since there may be multiple source
vertices, i.e., s1, s2, ..., sn1 , or multiple sink vertices, i.e., t1, t2, ..., tn2 .
A way to address this issue is to insert a new super-source vertex vs and a
super-sink vertex vt into G(V,E), i.e.,
V = V ∪ {vs, vt}. (7)
For each si ∈ S, we insert an edge (vs, si) into E. Then, for each ti ∈ T , we
insert (ti, vt) into E. Therefore,
E = E ∪ {(vs, si)|1 ≤ i ≤ n1} ∪ {(ti, vt)|1 ≤ i ≤ n2}. (8)
Thereafter, we assign an infinite large weight to each of the new edges to
represent the cost of removing it from the new graph. We take Fig. 3 for ex-
planation. In Fig. 3, we have S = {v1, v8} and T = {v3, v7, v9}. A super-source
vertex v10 (i.e., vs) and a super-sink vertex v11 (i.e., vt) are inserted. Five new
edges with the infinite large weight are inserted as well. In applications, one
could assign a very large weight (that is larger than the sum of weights of all
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original edges) to the new edges, instead of the infinite large weight. Accordingly,
a new graph can be built, as shown in Fig. (3). To find the maximum flow from
v10 to v11, we should decompose all edges shown in Fig. (3) into two directed
edges. By treating the weights of edges as the flow capacity, the maximum flow
from v10 to v11 can be determined as 61. And, the corresponding minimum cut
is {(v1, v3), (v1, v9), (v2, v9), (v8, v7)}. It means that, the minimum cost making
S and T unconnected is 61, and Eopt(S, T ) = {(v1, v3), (v1, v9), (v2, v9), (v8, v7)}.
Another way to determine Eopt(S, T ) is vertex contraction. The contraction
of a set of vertices produces a graph in which all vertices in the set are replaced
with a single vertex such that the single vertex is adjacent to the union of
the vertices to which the vertices in the set were originally adjacent. In vertex
contraction, it does not matter if two vertices in S or T are connected by an
edge, which (if any) is simply removed during contraction.
In detail, we initialize G′(V ′, E′) as V ′ = ∅ and E′ = ∅. For each (vi, vj) ∈ E,
we skip it if {vi, vj} ⊂ S or {vi, vj} ⊂ T . Otherwise, if vi /∈ S∪T and vj /∈ S∪T ,
we update V ′ as V ′ = V ′ ∪ {vi, vj} and E′ as E′ = E′ ∪ {(vi, vj)}. The weights
assigned to edges should be processed as well. If vi ∈ S and vj ∈ T , we first
update V ′ as V ′ = V ′ ∪ {vs, vt} and then update E′ = E′ ∪ {(vs, vt)}. The
weight of (vi, vj) will be added to (vs, vt). If vi ∈ S and vj /∈ T , we first update
V ′ as V ′ = V ′ ∪ {vs, vj} and then update E′ = E′ ∪ {(vs, vj)}. The weight of
(vi, vj) will be added to (vs, vj). It is similar to process other cases. In this way,
a new graph can be finally constructed. Thereafter, by computing the maximum
flow from vs to vt in the new graph, the minimum cost can be obtained, and
the minimum cut can be constructed as well. Fig. 4 shows an example, in which
{v1, v8} and {v3, v7, v9} are replaced with vs and vt, respectively. It is seen that,
the maximum flow in the new graph is identical to the maximum flow shown
in Fig. 3, which has verified the correctness. Notice that, in Fig. 4 (b), after
determining out the minimum cut {(vs, vt), (v2, vt)} in G′(V ′, E′). We have to
further construct the minimum cut for G(V,E). Clearly, it is observed that
(vs, vt) is corresponding to {(v1, v3), (v1, v9), (v8, v7)}, and (v2, vt) corresponds
to (v2, v9). Therefore, we have Eopt(S, T ) = {(v1, v3), (v1, v9), (v2, v9), (v8, v7)}.
Remark. For a given directed graph, one can determine the maximum flow
from the source vertex to the sink vertex by any efficient maximum flow algo-
rithm. After calling a maximum flow algorithm, the flow information passing
through each vertex can be identified. Notice that, the flow passing through an
edge will be not larger than its capacity. To determine the cut, one can find the
set of vertices that are reachable from the source vertex in the corresponding
residual graph [17]. All edges involving a reachable vertex and a non-reachable
vertex constitute the minimum cut. This can be completed by applying depth-
first search (DFS) technique with a time complexity of O(|V |+ |E|).
4 Steganographic Strategy Between Neighbors
It seems to be interesting and reasonable that the steganographic communication
in a steganographer network is only available between adjacent vertices (or say
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Fig. 5. Three examples of dividing all vertices into two sets S and T : a vertex marked
as “1” means it belongs to S and “0” for T .
between neighbors). This scenario looks closer to reality comparing with the case
that an encoder in G should participate in the path planning for steganographic
communication. The reason is that an edge between any two vertices does not
only represent the steganographic channel between them, but also, to a certain
extent, shows the social relationship between them. Thus, it may be not desirable
sometimes for a vertex to communicate a message along a predetermined network
path with another vertex that is not a neighbor. In this section, we will analyze
steganography between neighbors within the steganographer network.
Mathematically, for a given G(V,E), all vertices will serve as either a data
encoder or a data decoder. One may assume that, G(V,E) is a subnetwork
determined from a complex network in which the vertices may serve as more
complex roles. Therefore, it can be said that, we actually deal with a simplified
model in this paper even though the complex cases are not explicit for us at
present. We are to choose a set of vertices from V to constitute S mentioned
previously and the rest will constitute T , i.e., T = V \S. We define the neighbor-
set of v ∈ V as N(v) = {u|(u, v) ∈ E}. It is required that, for any v ∈ T , there
should exist at least one u ∈ S such that u ∈ N(v). It ensures that, any vertex
in V can either hold a message by itself (in S) or receive a message directly from
a neighbor belonging to S. Accordingly, all vertices can share a message.
The determination of S corresponds to a binary network game [21]. Clearly,
each individual vertex v ∈ V must choose an action g(v) ∈ X = {0, 1}, where
action g(v) = 0 indicates it servers as a data decoder, and g(v) = 1 for a data
encoder. Therefore, it is required that
∀v ∈ V,
∑
u∈N(v)
g(u) ≥ 1− g(v). (9)
Fig. 5 shows three examples of dividing V into two sets S and T . It is seen
that, there exist lots of legal solutions. An intuitive requirement is to minimize
the number of data encoders, i.e.,
∑
v∈V g(v), subject to Eq. (9). Simply minimiz-
ing
∑
v∈V g(v), however, indicates that all vertices essentially have no difference
and have the same importance (or say that they have the same risk/cost). From
a generalized viewpoint, we can assign a positive weight w(v) to each v ∈ V to
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evaluate the cost or risk of marking v as a member of S. By assuming an additive
G(V,E), under the constraint of Eq. (9), our task is to minimize∑
v∈V
g(v) · w(v), (10)
which is a typical 0-1 integer linear programming (ILP) problem.
In graph theory, the family of vertex/edge covering problems involves a broad
range of NP-hard optimization problems, among which the minimum-weight
dominating set (MWDS) problem has played a prominent role in various real-
world domains such as social networks, wireless ad-hoc networks, communication
networks, and industrial applications [22]. For G(V,E), a dominating set D is
a subset of V such that each v ∈ V \ D is adjacent to at least one member of
D. The MWDS problem aims to find a dominating set Dmin that minimizes the
total positive weights assigned to the vertices in the dominating set, namely
Dmin = arg min
D⊂V
∑
v∈D
w(v), (11)
subject to
∀u ∈ V \D,N(u) ∩D 6= ∅. (12)
Obviously, the ILP problem shown in Eqs. (9, 10) is equivalent to the MWDS
problem. Since the MWDS problem is known as a NP-hard problem, generally
we have to use approximation algorithms to find the near-optimal solution unless
all NP problems can be effectively solved [23] or G(V,E) has a small size (or has
some special topological structure). For steganography between neighbors in G,
a core research is therefore to design effective approximation algorithms for the
MWDS problem.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we introduce two simplified optimization problems in a steganog-
rapher network theoretically. Both problems are proven to be equivalent to the
minimum cut problem (or say the maximum flow problem since they are dual
to each other) and the minimum-weight dominating set problem, respectively.
The optimal/near-optimal solutions to the corresponding problems can be found
by exploiting graph-modification techniques (e.g., vertex contraction) as well as
related deterministic/approximation algorithms used in graph theory.
For the passive attack, to identify the suspicious vertices, one may use ste-
ganalysis algorithms or anomaly detection algorithms designed for complex net-
works. On the one hand, these approaches provide the attacker access to finding
both suspicious vertices and edges (corresponding to suspicious channels). On
the other hand, the suspicious edges will help the attacker to evaluate the cost
of removing an edge from the steganographer network. Notice that, the cost
of removing an edge may take into account the local topological characteristics
since a steganographer network may contain community features. For example,
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the edges connecting two communities may be assigned with a high cost. The
suited definition of cost of removing an edge will be the future work.
Another reasonable explanation for steganography between neighbors is that,
a vertex may have not complete information on the steganographer network. It
may lead each vertex to send a message via steganography to its neighbors or
receive a message via steganography directly from its neighbors. We propose to
find the MWDS in the steganographer network, which, however, has implied that
the vertices know the complete information about the network or there should
exist an ideal “super-vertex” that can access the whole network structure and
can communicate with each vertex in the network. From the viewpoint of game
theory, in case that each vertex has incomplete information about the whole
network, the determination of the suited dominating set is more difficult since a
vertex may only use its local information and may be affected by its neighbors’
actions. Moreover, the determination of weights assigned to vertices in practice
is not explicit to us either. We will focus on this problem in future.
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